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Private Threats, Public Stigma? Avoiding False
Dichotomies in the Application of Megan's Law to the
Juvenile Justice System
Michael L. Skoglund*
When Mary was eleven years-old, she sexually abused a
four-year-old boy.1 She admitted committing acts that would
constitute second-degree criminal sexual conduct,2 and was
adjudicated delinquent by a Minnesota juvenile court.3 When
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. Ma-
calester College, 1995. The author wishes to thank the clients and coworkers
he worked with at day treatment programs from 1991 to 1995; they provided
the inspiration to search for utilitarian responses to deal with youthful offend-
ers.
1. Mary is a hypothetical character based on the petitioner in In re Wel-
fare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding the ap-
plication of Minnesota's sex offender registration statute to juveniles).
2. Second-degree criminal sexual conduct is an offense in Minnesota's
adult criminal justice system. See MINN. STAT. § 609.343 subd. 1(a) (1998). It
is defined as sexual contact between a complainant who is under thirteen and
an actor who is at least three years older. See id. For individuals tried in the
adult system, this offense is a felony. See id. § 609.343 subd. 2 (prescribing
felony-level penalties for second-degree criminal sexual conduct). See gener-
ally MINN. STAT. § 609.03 subd. 1 (1998) (providing punishment for felony of-
fenders).
3. In re Welfare of C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d at 435. Minnesota juvenile courts
have significant discretion in selecting dispositions for the rehabilitation of
delinquent children. See MINN. STAT. § 260B.198 subd. 1 (1998). Mary could
receive a remedy as lenient as informal counseling from the bench, see id.
§ 260.185 subd. 1(a), but it is more likely that she will be committed to a se-
cured facility operated by the commissioner of corrections. See generally id.
§ 260.185 subd. 1(c) (describing criteria judges should use in making the de-
termination, inter alia the child's welfare and risk to the public). As a juvenile
sex offender, Mary must receive treatment "structured to address both [her]
therapeutic and disciplinary needs." MINN. STAT. § 242.195 subd. 1(b) (1998).
Yet, this ostensive commitment to rehabilitation is undermined by the statu-
tory requirement that dispositions to secure facilities must be determinate
rather than indeterminate. See MINN. R. Juv. CT. PROC. Rule 15.05 subd. 3
(1998). The system can impose post-confinement probation or treatment until
she turns 18, see MINN. STAT. § 260B.101 subd. 1 (Supp. 1999), but Mary will
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Nathan was twelve, he and a friend sexually assaulted a teen-
age girl.4 A New York juvenile court judge found that Nathan
committed acts that would constitute second-degree sexual
abuse,5 and adjudicated him delinquent.6
Both Minnesota and New York have enacted Megan's Law
statutes, 7 but the application of these laws to Mary and Nathan
illustrates the uncomfortable fit between the rehabilitative
ideal underlying the juvenile justice system, and new punitive
legislative responses to sex offenders. Because the two states
share a commitment to rehabilitating juvenile sex offenders,
both Mary and Nathan should receive treatment designed to
correct their behavior and mold them into productive members
be committed for, at most, the duration specified by the juvenile court judge
who issues the order. See infra note 34.
4. Nathan is a hypothetical character based loosely on the petitioner in
In re Brian B., 598 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (App. Div. 1993) (upholding the application
of adult sexual abuse statutes as the legal standard for children in juvenile
court cases).
5. In New York, second-degree sexual abuse is defined as sexual contact
with a complainant who is under fourteen years of age. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.60 (McKinney 1998). Surprisingly, the state does not categorize this
conduct as felonious, see id., so the court was not obligated to commit Nathan
to a secured facility, although it was within its discretion to do so. See infra
note 6.
6. See supra note 4. New York law accords juvenile courts discretion in
creating dispositions following an adjudication of delinquency. See N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 352.2 (McKinney 1998 and Supp. 1999-2000). Courts are charged
with the duty to balance "the needs and best interests of the [child] as well as
the need for protection of the community," and must select the least restrictive
dispositions for non-felony convictions. Id. § 352.2(2) (McKinney Supp. 1999-
2000). Given this discretion, a judge could place Nathan with a relative; how-
ever, it is more likely that the judge would consider the violent nature of Na-
than's crime and commit him to a secure facility. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 353.3(3) (McKinney 1998). Since New York, like Minnesota, uses determi-
nate sentencing, the maximum length of Nathan's confinement will be limited
by statute rather than by his response to treatment. See id. § 353.3(5). If Na-
than is placed in a secured facility, he must be released within eighteen
months, regardless of the status of his rehabilitation, even if there are post-
confinement treatment programs available. See id.
7. See MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1998 and Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT.
§ 244.052 (1998 and Supp. 1999); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168-a to 168-v
(McKinney Supp. 1999-2000). Megan's Law is the popular term for statutes
which require released sex offenders to register their presence with law en-
forcement and regulate public dissemination of information about those of-
fenders. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (describing the nomen-
clature, scope, and application of registration and community notification
statutes).
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of society.8 Yet, upon completion of their treatment, these chil-
dren may receive very different homecomings.
Although Mary's adjudication in Minnesota will be reha-
bilitative, that is, founded on specialized treatment designed to
correct her antisocial behavior,9 her release will trigger an
evaluation of her recidivism risk,10 she will be required to regis-
ter with the police," and her community may be notified of the
pubescent threat in its midst.' 2 Officials in the juvenile justice
8. See MINN. STAT. § 242.18 (1998) (requiring the Commissioner of Cor-
rections to study children entrusted to the juvenile courts, and "investigate all
of the pertinent circumstances of the person's life and the antecedents of the
crime or other delinquent conduct because of which the person has been com-
mitted to the commissioner, and thereupon order the treatment the commis-
sioner determines to be most conducive to rehabilitation."); N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 45 subd. 6-b (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000) (requiring the State Commis-
sion of Correction to "[piromulgate rules and regulations, in consultation with
the division for youth, establishing minimum standards for the care, custody,
rehabilitation, treatment, supervision, discipline and other programs for cor-
rectional facilities operated by the division for youth").
9. The Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections is required to provide a
range of sex offender treatment programs for juveniles within secured and
residential facilities. See MINN. STAT. § 242.195 subd. 1 (1998); see also supra
note 3.
10. Before being released, Mary will be evaluated by an "end-of-
confinement review committee," MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd. 3(a) (Supp.
1999), that will assess the risk she poses to the public based on the serious-
ness of her offense, see id. § 244.052 subd. 3(g)(1); her prior history of offenses,
see id. § 244.052 subd. 3(g)(2); her characteristics, including response to
treatment and history of substance abuse, see id. § 244.052 subd. 3(g)(3); and
the availability of community services, including treatment, familial support,
and employment opportunities, and credible evidence indicating that she will
re-offend, see id. § 244.052 subd. 3(g)(4)-(5). Based on the review committee's
evaluation, Mary will be assigned a risk level: if the assessment indicates a
low risk of reoffense, she will be deemed a Level I offender; if she is considered
a medium risk, she will be deemed Level I; if she is considered a high risk,
she will be labeled a Level III offender. See id. § 244.052 subd. 2 (1998); id.
§ 244.052 subd. 3(e) (Supp. 1999).
11. The construction of the Minnesota sex offender registration statute
specifically encompasses juvenile delinquency adjudications, and guides the
application of the statute to juvenile offenders. See MINN. STAT. § 243.166
subd. 1 (Supp. 1999). The legislature required registration of people both con-
victed of, and adjudicated delinquent under, the criminal sexual conduct stat-
utes. See id. The statute also requires juvenile courts to inform juveniles of
their duty to register under the statute. See id. § 243.166 subd. 2.
12. The Minnesota community notification statute requires law enforce-
ment agencies where sex offenders will work or reside to disclose information
to the public based on the offenders' risk levels, see supra note 10, the threat
they pose to the public, see supra note 10, in addition to the community's need
"for information to enhance their individual and collective safety." MINN.
STAT. § 244.052 subd. 4 (Supp. 1999). If Mary is labeled a Level I offender, the
information collected about her will be provided only to law enforcement agen-
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system may be convinced of Mary's rehabilitation, but the
committee that construes and applies the registration and noti-
fication statutes can reach a different conclusion, and signifi-
cantly alter her reintegration into her community.13 Her juve-
nile court record can be publicized 14 and her adolescence
stigmatized 15 by an agent of the adult system, which imposes
adult tests and adult consequences on young offenders.
In New York, however, in spite of Nathan's sexually violent
tendencies the state will release him into his community with-
out notifying community members of his commission of a sex
crime.' 6 Like Mary, Nathan's release from the secured facility
will be a function of the length of his determinate sentence
rather than the completion of his rehabilitation; his confine-
ment will end regardless of whether he has improved or re-
gressed.' 7 He will reenter the population he once victimized as
an unremarkable teenager, moving among potential victims
cies, and the victims and witnesses of her crime. See id. § 244.052 subd.
4(b)(1). If she is assessed to be a Level II offender, the information will be
provided to groups she is likely to encounter: "the staff members of public and
private educational institutions, day care establishments, and establishments
and organizations that primarily serve individuals likely to be victimized by
the offender.... [and] individuals the agency believes are likely to be victim-
ized by the offender." Id. § 244.052 subd. 4(b)(2). If the committee deems
Mary to be a Level Ill offender, her presence and background may be disclosed
"to other members of the community whom the offender is likely to encounter."
Id. § 244.052 subd. 4(b)(3).
13. The Minnesota end-of-confinement review committee is not an agent
of the juvenile court system. See MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd. 3. The commit-
tee can consider juvenile court records, but it ultimately performs an inde-
pendent risk assessment based on a broad spectrum of criteria. See supra note
10.
14. There is a presumption in the juvenile justice system that records of
proceedings and dispositions will be confidential. See infra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
15. The rehabilitative goal of the juvenile justice system is ostensibly in-
compatible with the punitive and stigmatizing aspects of the adult model. See
infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
16. Adults convicted of second-degree sexual abuse are considered sexual
predators for the purposes of New York's Sex Offender Registration Act. See
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000). Because Nathan
was adjudicated delinquent rather than convicted of a criminal offense, see su-
pra note 6 and accompanying text, he is outside the scope of the registration
statute. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 720.35(1) (McKinney 1995) ("A youthful of-
fender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other of-
fense ... ."). See generally N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-a (making a "convic-
tion" the basis of a "sexual offender" designation).
17. See supra note 6.
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without arousing suspicion. 8 Nathan's neighbors and class-
mates may not learn about his past until he has committed an-
other violent sex crime. 19
Ultimately, the fate of juvenile sex offenders like Mary and
Nathan may not be a function of rehabilitative goals or public
safety concerns. Instead, poorly conceived statutory systems
may privilege one goal over the other without providing ade-
quate means of accomplishing either. Unless legislators care-
fully design the nexus of these systems, states may discover
that they have created patchwork legal processes that under-
mine both public policy goals of rehabilitation and public
safety. At one extreme, states with determinate sentencing
and no notification statutes may release unrehabilitated juve-
niles to reperpetrate in a legal vacuum;20 at the other, states
with notification statutes may improperly assess juveniles us-
ing adult criminal factors, and subject them to the stigma of
community notification, undermining their rehabilitation.21
Somewhere between the concern that the application of Me-
gan's Law will hinder rehabilitation, and the fear that its ab-
sence will perpetuate criminal behavior among juveniles, it is
possible to construct a policy that serves both important goals.
This Note will argue that the unique problems presented
by juvenile sex offenders are not appropriately addressed by
the application of conventional adult Megan's Law statutes to
juvenile court dispositions. Rather, these laws should be
shaped by the rehabilitative ideal, interpreted by agents of the
juvenile court, and applied with the purpose of protecting all
children. Part I explains the juvenile justice system, the chal-
lenges posed by juvenile sex offenders, and the evolution and
nuances of Megan's Law. Part II argues that determinate sen-
tencing and adult-oriented notification statutes are not proper
18. It stands to reason that juvenile sex offenders pose a unique threat to
public safety because interaction between them and other children is less re-
markable than that between adults and children. Children also commit a dis-
proportionately high proportion of sexual assaults with juvenile victims. See
infra note 50 and accompanying text.
19. Nathan's name and offense will be shielded under law. N.Y. Soc.
SERv. LAW § 372(3) (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000). State actors who are per-
mitted to access this information, such as social workers and foster parents,
see id., may be charged with a misdemeanor if they reveal "client-identifiable
information," id. § 372(4)(b)(ii).
20. Nathan may be on probation or in a rehabilitative program, but no
other members of the community, including law enforcement officials, will be
notified of his sex offenses. See supra note 16.
21. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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means of serving the state's interest in rehabilitating youthful
offenders and protecting potential victims. This Note concludes
that concerns about the efficacy of the juvenile justice system
are not properly addressed by treating juvenile sex offenders
like adults. Children should be treated until they are rehabili-
tated,22 assessed by agents of the juvenile justice system, and
made subject to notification only according to the policy goals of
the juvenile justice system.
I. THE HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL NEXUS OF
JUVENILE COURTS, JUVENILE SEX OFFENDERS, AND
MEGAN'S LAW
A. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
The juvenile justice system was created a century ago2 3 on
the belief that children are different from adults24 and should
be protected by the state.25 The juvenile court was philosophi-
cally founded on the "rehabilitative ideal,"26 the theory that the
state is parens patriae or the "common guardian of the commu-
nity."27 This rehabilitative model was conceptualized amidst
22. This Note asserts that the rehabilitative ideal is, in fact, the ideal
model for responding to juvenile offenders. Although the efficacy of different
rehabilitative strategies is discussed, see infra note 56, examination of puni-
tive or incapacitation models is both illogical, see infra note 87 and accompa-
nying text, and outside the scope of this Note.
23. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing
the Legal Order: The Case For Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1083, 1096 (1991).
24. See id. at 1093-96. Ainsworth begins with the premise that, in medie-
val times, children were "fully integrated members of the community." Id. at
1093. She argues that contemporary American distinctions between adults
and children, and the popularization of the notion of adolescence, were created
around the turn of the last century. See id. at 1094-98. "By the turn of the
century, the attributes of childhood were being applied to teenagers, who only
a generation earlier would not have been distinguished from older adults." Id.
at 1095 (footnote omitted).
25. See id. at 1096.
26. This term was originated by Francis A. Allen in his book, THE
BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 26
(1964). Barry Feld describes the rehabilitative ideal as a legal philosophy that
"emphasized open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies so that the
criminal justice professional had the discretion necessary to formulate indi-
vidualized, case-by-case strategies for rehabilitating the deviant." Barry C.
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile
Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 147 (1984).
27. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); see also Lanes v. Texas,
767 S.W.2d 789, 792 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc) (defining the term as
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an explosion of scientific progress in the early 1900s, and was
influenced by the popular belief that juvenile criminal behavior
could be treated scientifically.28 Progressives envisioned a
civil29 entity capable of diagnosing symptoms of antisocial be-
havior, and prescribing individualized remedies for young of-
fenders.30 Whereas adult criminal systems were implemented
to punish misdeeds and discourage criminality, the juvenile
justice system was intended to rehabilitate youthful offenders
and to protect the public.3'
Implemented according to the rehabilitative ideal, juvenile
court adjudications are unique because they address the child's
need for treatment rather than his offense. 32 Further, disposi-
"literally translated as, 'parent of the country").
28. Janet Ainsworth writes: "Juvenile misbehavior was seen as merely
the overt manifestation of underlying social pathology. Like physical pathol-
ogy, social pathology could not be ignored or the 'disease' might progressively
worsen. With proper diagnosis and treatment, however, social pathology was
considered as susceptible to cure as physical ailments." Ainsworth, supra note
23, at 1097; see also Feld, supra note 26, at 162 ("[It was assumed that a ra-
tional, scientific analysis of facts would reveal the proper diagnosis and pre-
scribe the cure."); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104,
120 (1909) ("In hundreds of cases the discovery and remedy of defective eye-
sight or hearing or some slight surgical operation will effectuate a complete
change in the character of the lad.").
29. The civil-criminal distinction lies at the heart of the difference be-
tween the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Because the state is at-
tempting to rehabilitate the child rather than punish an adult, procedural re-
quirements are relaxed and additional discretion is granted. See, e.g., Feld,
supra note 26, at 149 & n.25.
30. Anthony Platt describes the distinctions between the criminal and ju-
venile justice systems by pointing out that, in the latter system, a juvenile
suspect "was not accused of a crime but offered assistance and guidance; in-
tervention in his life was not supposed to carry the stigma of a criminal record;
judicial hearings were conducted in relative privacy; proceedings were infor-
mal and due process safeguards were not applicable due to the court's civil ju-
risdiction." ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY 1137-38 (2d ed. 1977).
31. See, e.g., NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASS'N, GUIDES FOR
JUVENILE COURT JUDGES 69 (1957) [hereinafter NPPA GUIDES FOR JUVENILE
COURT JUDGES] (dictating that "[t]he basic goals of the juvenile court are the
protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the delinquent child and the
protection of the neglected (or dependent) child"). The guidelines further state
that "the threat to the peace and security of the community remains unless
the underlying causes of the problem are treated and eliminated." Id.
32. Barry Feld argues that the "jurisprudence rejected blameworthiness
and deserved punishment for past offenses in favor of a utilitarian strategy of
future-oriented social welfare dispositions. In theory, judges decided why the
child appeared in court and what the court could do to change the character,
attitude, and behavior of the youth...." BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 70 (1999).
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tions are intended to be indeterminate, nonproportional, and
carefully implemented to nurture the juvenile's progress.33 In-
determinate sentences are a function of the offender's response
to treatment and as a result, vary in length. Unlike sentences
based on statutory guidelines, as in the criminal system, inde-
terminate dispositions in the juvenile system are limited only
by the child's amenability to treatment 34 and the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.35 Indeterminate juvenile court dispositions
are also nonproportional because they are unrelated to the na-
ture of the child's particular offense.36 Because juvenile court
dispositions are intended to bring at-risk youth within societal
33. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
34. Although adults are sentenced to a particular period of time, the juve-
nile justice system was founded on the belief that "[airbitrary time limits can-
not be set down as gauges for achieving certain changes in behavior." NPPA
GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra note 31, at 74. Indeterminate
sentences are permissible because they are civil rather than criminal, see su-
pra note 29 and accompanying text, and rehabilitative rather than punitive.
See, e.g., In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 554 (Cal. 1979) (holding that 'juvenile
court law continues to provide indeterminate terms, with provision for parole
as soon as appropriate"); Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941, 945, 947-48 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1969) (upholding the constitutionality of indeterminate sentencing as ap-
plied to minors). Judicial discretion may be limited, however, by statutory
guidelines. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.185 (1998 & Supp. 2000) (enumerat-
ing dispositions); MINN. R. JUV. CT. PROC. Rule 12.8.315 (1997) (stating
guidelines for courts to employ in juvenile proceedings); In re G.D.E., 313
N.W.2d 388, 389 (Minn. 1981) (holding that a juvenile court lacked the
authority to dispose indeterminate sentences in the face of statutory limita-
tions to the contrary). Minnesota courts, for example, usually require disposi-
tions to be narrowly tailored and respectful of familial bonds. See In re J.A.J.,
545 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the trial court should
have considered alternatives short of residential sex offender treatment); In re
L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 398 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "the court
must take the least drastic step" to effectuate the "purpose of restoring law-
abiding conduct" in juveniles).
35. States can limit the jurisdiction of their juvenile courts according to
factors such as age and offense. Barry Feld writes that "if [states] define juve-
nile court jurisdiction to include only those persons below a jurisdictional age
and whom prosecutors charge with a nonexcluded offense, then, by statutory
definition, all others are adults for purposes of criminal law." FELD, supra
note 32, at 219. For instance, even though Minnesota's juvenile justice system
generally has jurisdiction over minors until they turn eighteen, see MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260B.101 (West Supp. 2000), serious offenders can be waived
into the adult system, see infra note 42 and accompanying text, or treated
within the juvenile system until they turn 21. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260B.130 (West Supp. 2000).
36. See FELD, supra note 32, at 70 (asserting that "nonproportional meant
that no relationship existed between what the child allegedly did and the
length of disposition; the trivial or serious nature of the offense imposed no
limits in advance").
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norms, the juvenile system was designed to guarantee confi-
dentiality37 and avoid unnecessary stigmatization through use
of adult criminal labels and sanctions. 38
The actual implementation of the juvenile justice system as
a rehabilitative model, however, has been questioned by the
Supreme Court, theorists, practitioners, and members of the
public. The Supreme Court has extended many elements of
criminal procedure to juvenile dispositions.39 In dicta, the
Court has been skeptical of adversarial and punitive elements
adopted by state juvenile justice systems that never incorpo-
rated due process guarantees for juvenile offenders.40 Mean-
37. See PLAIT, supra note 30, at 137 (noting that juvenile records and
hearings were kept private); JOHN C. WATKINS JR., THE JUVENILE JusTICE
CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 122-
26 (1998) (describing the history and rationale for confidentiality in juvenile
proceedings). In modern applications of the juvenile justice system, confiden-
tiality tends to fray in proportion with the offender's age. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 260.155 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000) (allowing public access to felony
proceedings for children sixteen and older); see also infra note 42 (discussing
how some offenders and classes of offenders can be waived out of the juvenile
system entirely, and made subject to the norms of the adult criminal justice
system).
38. See PLATr, supra note 30, at 137 (noting that judicial "intervention" in
the lives of juveniles "was not supposed to carry the stigma of a criminal rec-
ord"); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Pun-
ishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 823-25
(1988) (describing the changing focus of some courts from the juvenile offender
to the nature of their conduct).
39. See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (finding constitutional ju-
veniles' rights to protection from coerced confessions); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 561-64 (1966) (constitutionalizing juveniles' rights to procedural
due process in certification hearings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967)
(finding constitutional juveniles' rights of notice, counsel, confrontation on
cross-examination, and protection from self-incrimination); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 361-68 (1970) (constitutionalizing juveniles' right to convictions re-
quiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 547-51 (1971) (holding that jury trials are not required in juvenile courts);
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-31 (1975) (announcing juveniles' protection
against double jeopardy convictions); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-70
(1984) (upholding the validity of pre-trial detention); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985) (holding that students have diminished Fourth
Amendment protection from school searches because of their diminished pri-
vacy interest on school grounds).
40. For example, in Breed v. Jones the Court stated that:
although the juvenile court system had its genesis in the desire to
provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems
of youth ... our decisions in recent years have recognized that there
is a gap between the originally benign conception of the system and
its realities.
421 U.S. at 528; see also Haley, 332 U.S. at 601 (declining to indulge the as-
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while, the public has begun to view young offenders as crack-
selling, gun-toting city kids rather than as malleable lads and
lasses.41 Politicians have responded to this public sentiment by
allowing certain young offenders, and classes thereof, to be
waived into the adult criminal justice system.42 Yet, amidst
criticisms of the system from retributionists who believe it to be
too lenient, and progressives who believe it to be too severe, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to require any wholesale
changes: "If the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process
are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is
little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate
disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are
disinclined to give impetus to it."43 At the centennial anniver-
sary of the juvenile court," its future is torn between the reha-
bilitative ideal upon which it was founded, the retributive in-
stincts that drive politicians and factions of the public, 45 and
sumptions that "a boy of fifteen, without aid of counsel, would have a full ap-
preciation of that advice and that on the facts of this record he had a freedom
of choice"); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543-44 (noting that "the fond and idealistic
hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three genera-
tions ago have not been realized").
41. Barry Feld writes, "public and political fears of social disorder, of the
young, and of urban blacks exacerbated the crisis of law and order, provided
fuel for advocates of repression, and led conservative critics to denounce juve-
nile courts for coddling young criminals." FELD, supra note 32, at 11.
42. A thorough discussion of juvenile waiver is inapposite to this Note,
since juvenile offenders may be waived into the adult system for committing
acts predicated on sexual violence. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.125
(West Supp. 2000) (describing certification of juveniles to adult criminal
court); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.10 (McKinney 1999) (describing proce-
dures for placing minor offenders in the different justice systems). The appli-
cation of adult registration and notification statutes to the products of the
adult criminal justice system is, if nothing else, logically consistent. See FELD,
supra note 32, at 208-18 (discussing the evolution of juvenile waiver); Marcy
Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449, 461-92 (1996)
(describing the actual application of judicial waiver by Minnesota courts);
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legisla-
tive Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471,
487-99 (1987) (describing the evolution of waiver statutes); Barry C. Feld, Ref-
erence of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Alternative
to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515, 516-520, 521-78
(1978) (describing the rationale for waiver systems and explaining their im-
plementation).
43. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551.
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45. The current status of different states' juvenile justice systems is
neatly summarized in a recent publication by the Department of Justice. See
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE
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the ever-growing need to cope with juveniles who perpetrate
and reperpetrate sexual assaults against their peers.
B. THE JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER
Either unanticipated or unmentioned by the progressives
who created the juvenile justice system, the juvenile sex of-
fender poses unique challenges to juvenile courts. Not only are
youth a significant proportion of the sex offender population,46
but the effects of their behavior are long-lasting and arguably
perpetuate the cycle of abuse.47
The United States Department of Justice reports that ju-
veniles commit between thirty and fifty percent of reported
cases of child sexual abuse,48 and approximately sixteen per-
cent of reported rapes each year.49 These statistics are signifi-
cant because juveniles comprise a relatively small percentage of
the population 5° Because children commit a disproportionately
high percentage of sexual offenses, and the jurisdiction of the
juvenile system is generally limited to their eighteenth birth-
days,51 their rehabilitation presents unique public policy chal-
lenges because the system has a finite period of time to assess
and treat these young offenders.52
JUSTICE: A CENTURY OF CHANGE 3-19 (1999), available at <http:/www.ncjrs.
org/pdffiles1/ojdp/178995.pdf> (identifying the different ways state legisla-
tures attempt to prevent juvenile delinquency).
46. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
48. See Earl F. Martin & Marsha Kline Pruett, The Juvenile Sex Offender
and the Juvenile Justice System, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 279, 287 (1998) (stating
that "approximately 20% of all rapes and between 30% and 50% of all child
molestations are perpetrated by adolescent males" (citations omitted)).
49. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, su-
pra note 45, 4 (citing Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: A FOCUS
ON VIOLENCE (1995)); see also Martin & Pruett, supra note 48, at 287.
50. The United States Census Bureau estimated the U.S. population at
273,866,000 people in November 1999; it also estimated that slightly less than
sixty-million people were between five and nineteen years-old. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION ESTIMATES OF THE UNITED STATES
BY AGE AND SEx: APRIL 1, 1990 TO NOVEMBER 1, 1999 (released Dec. 23, 1999)
available at <http//www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intfile2-1.
txt>. Even if one accepts the premise that the entire population of juveniles is
capable of committing rape (which is impossible), the statistics indicate that
juveniles commit a disproportionate rate of sexual abuse, and at least a pro-
portionate rate of rapes.
51. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52. This is true, if for no other reason than because, if unrehabilitated,
these juveniles will pose a threat to society for decades to come. See generally
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Sexual abuse by minors is also significant because it often
imposes psychological and social effects on its victims. People
who are abused during childhood are more likely to be arrested
later in life.53 Studies have also demonstrated that convicted
criminals with a history of physical or sexual abuse are more
likely than other inmates to victimize children.5 4 A National
Institute of Justice study on the effects of child victimization
showed that at some point after being abused, nearly 30% of
sexual assault victims developed posttraumatic stress disor-
der.55 Studies indicate that aberrant sexual conduct can be
treated56 and treatment strategies are improving.57 Yet, the
infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. The high rate of juvenile offenders
also begs the sociological question (which is outside the scope of this Note) of
whether juveniles have always comprised a disproportionate rate of offenders,
or whether modem America's socialization of children is becoming increas-
ingly dysfinctional.
53. See CATHY SPATZ WIDOM, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN
BRIEF, VICTIMS OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE-LATER CRIMINAL
CONSEQUENCES 4 (1995), available at <http'//www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/abuse.
pdf>. While only 16.8% of people without a history of abuse are arrested at
some point in their lives, 26% of people who have been abused or neglected are
arrested. See id. Although people with a history of sexual abuse are no more
likely to be arrested than those who are physically abused or neglected, they
are more likely to be arrested for committing sex crimes. See id. at 5-6.
54. See MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997
UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 5 (1997), available at <http'//www.ncjrs.org/
pdffiles/juvoff.pdf>. Nearly one-half of violent offenders who reported a his-
tory of sexual abuse had victimized children, compared with almost one-third
of those with a history of physical abuse, and only 16% of those with no such
history of abuse. See id. A second survey revealed that inmates who had
abused children were twice as likely to have been physically or sexually
abused than their peers who chose adult victims. See LAWRENCE A.
GREENFIELD, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT
OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 7 (1996), available at <http'//www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoatv.pdf>. While 22% of the violent inmates who abused
children reported that they had been sexually abused, less than 6% of inmates
with adult victims reported similar experiences. See id.
55. See DEAN KILPATRICK & BENJAMIN SAUNDERS, NATIONAL INST. OF
JUSTICE, RESEARCH PREVIEW: THE PREVALENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CHILD VICTIMIZATION 2 (1997). The authors stated that, years after their vic-
timization, almost twenty percent of victims still suffered from posttraumatic
stress disorder. See id. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a psychologi-
cal disorder characterized by recurrent fright and flashbacks. See generally
Nancy C. Andreasen, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in 2 COMPREHENSIVE
TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1517 (3d ed. 1980).
56. The authors of Practice Parameters point to evidence suggesting that
sexual abusive behavior is a consequence of emotional, developmental, and
behavioral disorders, and argue that successful intervention "requires an inte-
grated, multimodal treatment program which is tailored to the individual's
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clinical presentation and family support system." See Practice Parameters for
the Assessment and Treatment of Children and Adolescents Who Are Sexually
Abusive of Others, J. AI. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY, Dec.
1999, at 67S [hereinafter Practice Parameters]. Martin and Pruett performed
a meta-analysis of publications on the efficacies of different treatment strate-
gies, and suggested that a combination of treatment strategies may be more
efficient than relying on only one system. See Martin & Pruett, supra note 48,
at 312 (citations omitted). In their discussion of treatment strategies, the
Practice Parameters authors cite three general treatment strategies: cognitive-
behavioral, psychosocial, and psychopharmacological. See Practice Parame-
ters, supra, at 69S-70S.
First, cognitive-behavioral interventions provide offenders with informa-
tion about, and coping strategies for, their disorders. See id. at 69S-70S.
Rothchild, in his article, cites such a program, which teach juveniles to associ-
ate "masturbatory satiation" with "proper sexual cues," while associating illicit
tendencies with arrest and embarrassment. See Sander N. Rothchild, Note
and Comment, Beyond Incarceration: Juvenile Sex Offender Treatment Pro-
grams Offer Youths a Second Chance, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 719, 749-50 (1995).
Second are psychosocial interventions, including different individual,
group, family, and community-based therapy structures. See Practice Parame-
ters, supra, at 70S-71S. The authors indicate that these models allow the sys-
tem to treat different aspects of the youthful offender's problems: for instance,
group therapy confronts the youth with peers "who are not easily manipu-
lated, and who are able to confront the attempts at minimalization and de-
nial." Id. at 70S. Individual therapy builds the rapport between child and cli-
nician. See id. at 70S. Family therapy, meanwhile, rebuilds the offender's
support system at home. See id.
The third group consists of psychopharmacological interventions, which
work either by addressing compulsive behavior or by lowering testosterone
levels. See id. at 71S-72S. The authors acknowledge, however, that there are
ethical considerations because of side effects and the fact that the Food and
Drug Administration has yet to approve the use of antiandrogen drugs to
lower hormone levels in sex offenders. See id. at 72S. Unless medication can
cure rather than merely treat aberrant sexual behavior, agents of the juvenile
justice system will need to carefully consider whether the benefit to public
safety outweighs the potential costs to children.
57. The authors of Practice Parameters cite studies indicating that recidi-
vism rates for adolescent sex offenders in treatment programs ranges from 5%
to 15%, as opposed to 7% to 40% for offenders who are untreated. See Practice
Parameters, supra note 56, at 68S. They cite four reasons why juvenile of-
fenders may be more susceptible to treatment than adults: first, their pattern
of sexual offending is less deeply ingrained; second, they are still exploring dif-
ferent paths to sexual gratification; third, their core masturbatory fantasies
are still evolving; and fourth, they may still learn reasonable social skills. See
id. at 68S-69S. Martin and Pruett acknowledge that it is too soon to make
sweeping conclusions about new methods of treatment, but argue that
"[s]ufficient strides have been made to suggest that 'modem treatments, which
have changed and improved significantly in the past fifteen years, have a sig-
nificant impact on the recidivism rates for many offenders.'" Martin & Pruett,
supra note 48, at 310 (quoting Judith V. Becker, Offenders: Characteristics
and Treatment, 4 SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 181, 185 (1994)); see also Roth-
child, supra note 56, at 746-56 (describing "[tihe remarkable success of treat-
ment programs"). Rothchild argues that the efficacy of modern treatments for
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primary effects of sexual assault and molestation are followed
by secondary effects that perpetuate the cycles of abuse.58 As a
contagion phenomenon 59 that targets children, and reproduces
itself in generation after generation, sexual crime by and
against children has increasingly attracted the attention of
legislators.
C. MEGAN'S LAW
"Megan's Law"60 is the popular nomenclature for two re-
lated types of laws: sex offender registration statutes and corn-
sex offenders makes them preferable to dispositions based on retribution. See
id. at 758.
58. Surveys indicate that 19-81% of juvenile sex offenders were survivors
of sexual abuse. See Raymond A. Knight & Robert A. Prentky, Exploring
Characteristics for Classifying Juvenile Sex Offenders, in THE JUVENILE SEX
OFFENDER 49 (Howard E. Barbaree et al. eds., 1993). Martin and Pruett also
argue that, because of the unique and cyclical nature of sexual offenses, they
pose a significant rehabilitative challenge:
Perhaps the most widely reported shared experience among young sex
offenders is a history of sexual victimization. This form of victimiza-
tion may perpetuate what is commonly known as the cycle of abuse;
i.e., ... victims of sexual abuse often re-create their experiences...
with themselves as the perpetrators.
Martin & Pruett, supra note 48, at 298-99 (citations omitted). Martin and
Pruett point to studies which show that nearly half of sex offenders had "ac-
quired their deviant interests" before reaching the age of eighteen. Id. at 285-
87. The prevalence of sexual offenses committed by juveniles, see supra notes
48-50 and accompanying text, and the likelihood of reperpetration by juvenile
victims, see supra note 53, support the state's interest in addressing this issue.
59. Sexual abuse is so frightening and pernicious because its commission
can lead to further commissions. See supra note 58. Like a meme, or a social
virus, such abuse is transmittable from victim to victim to victim. Cf. Barry C.
Feld, Juvenile Justice Lecture (Sept. 27, 1999) (describing drug abuse as a
"contagion phenomenon").
60. The popular term for the body of sex offender registration and com-
munity notification laws named after Megan Kanka. When seven year-old
Megan's family reported her missing, they could not have dreamed that the
young man who lived across the street would, days later, confess to luring her
into his home, strangling her, sexually assaulting her, killing her, and hiding
her body. See Ralph Siegel, Suspect Admits Killing Girl, 7: Also Accused of
Sexual Abuse, RECORD (N.J.), Aug. 2, 1994, 1-4, available in 1994 WL
7768092. The public later discovered that Megan's attacker had once pled
guilty to attempted sexual assault and aggravated assault for a 1981 attack in
which he dragged a seven year-old girl into a wooded area and began choking
her. See Sex Offender Charged in Girl's Strangulation: 7-Year-Old's Body
Found After Massive Search, RECORD (N.J.), Aug. 1, 1994, 13-15, available
in 1994 WL 7771183. Within days of her attacker's confession, Megan's par-
ents called for the enactment of a statute requiring neighborhoods to be noti-
fied when convicted sex offenders are released into their midst. See Siegel,
supra, % 13-15. As early as August 2-four days after Megan's death-news-
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munity notification statutes. Although these statutes have
only been in existence since the state of Washington enacted
the prototype in 1990,61 public and federal62 concern about sex
offenders increased exponentially after the New Jersey enact-
ment in 1994.63 Registration statutes require released sex of-
fenders to register their presence in a community with local law
enforcement agencies.M Community notification statutes re-
quire those law enforcement agencies to notify their communi-
ties about the presence and criminal history of certain sex of-
fenders.6 5 Although every state has enacted some form of
Megan's Law, the statutes differ widely in their application to
juvenile offenders. Nineteen states, including both Minnesota 66
and New York,67 have enacted community notification stat-
papers reported that her father "endorse[d] the idea for legislation already
nicknamed the 'Megan law' requiring neighborhood notification when sex of-
fenders move to a community." Id. 14.
61. See, e.g., Patricia L. Petrucelli, Comment, Megan's Law: Branding the
Sex Offender or Benefitting the Community?, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1127,
1129 & n.10 (1995). The Washington statute was enacted as part of the Com-
munity Protection Act of 1990. See Community Protection Act, ch. 3, 1990
Wash. Laws 12. Enacted in the wake of a series of vicious attacks by released
sex offenders, the legislature founded the enactment on its determination that
"sex offenders ... pose a high risk of reoffense, and that law enforcement's ef-
forts to protect their communities, conduct investigations, and quickly appre-
hend offenders who commit sex offenses, are impaired by the lack of informa-
tion available to law enforcement agencies." Id. § 401, 1990 Wash. Laws 12,
49.
62. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offenders Registration Program Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (Supp. III 1997), with-
held ten percent of federal finding for anti-crime initiatives to states that
failed to enact sex offender regulation statutes. See id. § 14071(f). Jacob Wet-
terling was an eleven year-old boy who was abducted near his home by a
stranger in 1989. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, After Nine Years, Family Still
Searching for Missing Peace, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.), Dec. 31, 1998, % 4,
available in 1998 WL 21287576.
63. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995 and Supp. 1999); see
also, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (Supp. 1999); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168-a to
168-v (McKinney Supp. 2000).
64. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
66. See MINN. STAT. § 244.052 (Supp. 1999). As discussed above, Minne-
sota's notification statute creates a process for qualifying risk, and notifying
aspects of the community according to that risk. See supra notes 10, 12.
67. The New York statute is similar to Minnesota's in that it establishes a
"board of examiners of sex offenders," N.Y. CORRECT. LAw § 168-1(1) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1999-2000), which evaluates sex offenders before they are released
from custody. See id. § 168-1(6). The board ultimately recommends whether
the offender will be deemed a sexually violent predator, and therefore subject
to community notification. See id. Like the Minnesota statute, see supra
20001 1819
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1805
utes.68 Seventeen of the fifty-one registration laws,69 and ten of
the nineteen notification statutes, 70 apply to juveniles. Many of
notes 10-12, the New York statute creates three classifications of offenders,
with corresponding levels of community notification. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 168-1(6). For offenders with a low risk of recidivism, only law enforcement
agencies in the criminal's jurisdiction are notified. See id. § 168-1(6)(a). For
those with a medium risk, law enforcement agencies in the offender's jurisdic-
tion will be notified and authorized to disclose information about the offender's
presence and history "to any entity with vulnerable populations related to the
nature of the offense." Id. § 168-1(6)(b). This effectively ends the offender's
confidentiality, because the statute allows "[any entity receiving information
on a sex offender [to] disclose or further disseminate such information at their
discretion." Id. Finally, if the risk to public safety is high, the information
shall be made available to law enforcement agencies, entities with vulnerable
populations, and to the public at large through a subdirectory of sexual preda-
tors. See id. § 168-1(6)(c). The contents of the New York subdirectory are
available by a 900 telephone service, see N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-p (McKin-
ney Supp. 1999-2000), and a physical directory distributed to towns and vil-
lages. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-q (McKinney Supp. 1998-2000).
68. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 290(m)-(n) (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5(6.5)
(West Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(7) (West Supp. 2000); 730 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 152/101 to 152/120 (West Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-
11 (Michie Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.13 (West Supp. 1999); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West
1995 & Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.10 (Supp. 1999); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.589 (Supp. 1998); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9798 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-11 (Supp.
1998); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 62.08 (West Supp. 2000); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.540 (West Supp. 1997) (adults); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§9 13.40.215-.217 (West Supp. 2000) (juveniles); W. VA. CODE § 15-12-5 (Supp.
1999).
69. In addition to Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.165-.166 (West
1998 & Supp. 2000), the following states apply registration statutes to juve-
niles: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3821 to -3826 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5
(West Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-12-1 to -12-13 (Michie Supp. 1997);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 692A.1 to 692A.16 (West Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15:540 to :549 (West Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 178D (Law.
Co-op. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.721 to .731 (West Supp. 1999);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -
11 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.585 - .606 (Supp. 1998);
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); TEX. CRiM. P.
CODE ANN. §§ 62.01-.12 (West Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-298.1 to
298.3 (Supp. 1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130 (West Supp. 2000);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 301.45 (West 1999).
70. In addition to Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. § 244.052 (1999), the fol-
lowing states apply community notification statutes to juveniles: CAL. PENAL
CODE § 290(m)-(n) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-412.5(6.5)
(West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-11 (Michie Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 692A.13 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-33-17 (Supp. 1999);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.589 (Supp.
1998); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. §§ 62.01-.12 (West Supp. 2000); WASH. REV.
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these statutes were originally challenged or criticized as being
in violation of the ex post facto, 71 double jeopardy,72 or due pro-
cess 73 clauses, but their constitutionality has generally been
upheld.74
CODE ANN. §§ 13.40.215-.217 (West Supp. 2000).
71. The United States Constitution flatly proscribes retroactive applica-
tion of penal legislation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall...
pass any... ex post facto Law.... ."). The Supreme Court has referred to the
Ex Post Facto Clause as a safeguard against the "risk that [a legislature] may
be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against un-
popular groups or individuals." Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244,
266 (1994). However, courts have consistently held that since Megan's Law
statutes are not penal, they are therefore outside the scope of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1272-86 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding both New York statutes against an ex post facto challenge).
72. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "). Double jeopardy
challenges, like ex post facto, tend to revolve around whether subsequent state
action is actually punitive. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,
270-71, 278-79, 287-88 (1996) (upholding civil forfeiture of assets subsequent
to federal drug-crime convictions). Therefore, a Megan's Law statute would
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if the notification or registration require-
ment constitutes a second punishment for a person who has just completed
their original sentence. However, courts have held that these statutes are not
punitive and, as a result, there is no double jeopardy violation. See, e.g., Pa-
taki, 120 F.3d at 1274-85 (upholding New York's Sex Offender Registration
Act against a double jeopardy challenge).
73. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ."); U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 ("No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law...."). Some theorists have argued that the serious
consequences of community notification demand more procedural precautions
than the juvenile justice system usually allows. See, e.g., Mark J. Swearingen,
Comment, Megan's Law as Applied to Juveniles: Protecting Children at the
Expense of Children?, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 525, 567 (1997) (explaining
that "if this trend away from rehabilitative goals continues, due process re-
quires that jury trials be afforded to all juvenile offenders, thus reversing the
holding of McKeiver, but continuing to honor the principles for which it
stands"). Courts have held that, with reasonable procedural safeguards, regis-
tration and notification statutes are constitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz,
662 A.2d 367, 417-22 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing the right to due process before
community notification, but concluding that procedural safeguards are met by
a pre-notification hearing).
74. Although earlier theorists questioned the constitutionality of this body
of law, see, e.g., Swearingen, supra note 73, at 563-68 (arguing that Megan's
Law violates the due process and equal protection rights of juvenile sex of-
fenders), courts have upheld the notable statutes created in Washington, see
Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997), and New Jersey, see Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422-23 (N.J. 1995) (as applied to adult offenders); New
Jersey ex rel. B.G., 674 A.2d 178 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1996) (as applied to
juveniles). But cf. Pau P. v. Farmer, 80 F. Supp. 2d 320, 325-26 (D.N.J. 2000)
(holding that the rules promulgated for implementing the New Jersey statute
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Registration statutes create databases for law enforcement
to monitor individuals who have been convicted of identified
violent and sexual offenses.75 Sex offenders are required to
register with authorities upon release from confinement and
whenever they change addresses for a statutorily created pe-
riod of time.76 Since the contents of sex offender registries are
ostensibly intended for law enforcement purposes, their use is
restricted to state actors unless explicitly authorized by notifi-
cation statutes. 77
Notification statutes serve as both gatekeepers to confiden-
tial information about released offenders and as catalysts for
publication of information about potentially dangerous mem-
bers of the community. Proponents of these statutes believe
that community notification alerts potential victims and in-
creases the awareness of law enforcement officers and other
state actors.78 These laws may forbid public access to informa-
allowed too many unauthorized distributions of private data and requiring the
attorney general to issue new guidelines). The New York and Minnesota stat-
utes have also been upheld. See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997)
(upholding both New York registration and notification statutes); State v.
Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding the application of
Minnesota statute to adults).
75. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 243.166 (1998 & Supp. 1999); N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 168-b (McKinney Supp. 1999-2000). The Minnesota statute requires
registration of people convicted under murder, kidnapping, criminal sexual
conduct, indecent exposure, or other predatory crimes. See MINN. STAT.
§ 243.166 subd. 1. The New York statute mandates registration of people con-
victed of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, incest, unlawful imprisonment, and kid-
napping. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 168-a(1)-(3); 168-b.
76. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 243.166 subds. 2, 3, 6 (respectively requiring
initial registration, registration after change of address, and setting the dura-
tion of registration); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-c, -e, -f, -h (same).
77. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 243.166 subd. 7 (1998); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW
§ 168-1(6) (creating guidelines for disclosure of data on sex offenders); see also
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-u (establishing penalties for unauthorized disclo-
sure).
78. See, e.g., Chrisandrea L. Turner, Note, Convicted Sex Offenders v. Our
Children: Whose Interests Deserve the Greater Protection?, 86 KY. L.J. 477, 503
(1998); supra note 61 (quoting Washington's rationale). The actual efficacy of
these statutes has yet to be determined, however, because the statutes are
relatively new and research has consequently been very limited. The state of
Washington found that recidivist sex offenders subject to community notifica-
tion statutes were arrested faster than comparable recidivists who were not
subject to the statutes, but the level of re-offending for each group after 4.5
years was the same. See CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, AN
OVERVIEW OF SEX OFFENDER COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION PRACTICES: POLICY
IMPLICATIONS AND PROMISING APPROACHES 5 (1997). Since the statute did
not affect the rate of re-offending, but did improve the speed of arrests, its ef-
fectiveness is ambiprobative. According to another study, the California regis-
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tion about released offenders who are deemed to pose minimal
risks to their communities, 79 or they may require widespread
notice to communities about the presence of high-risk offend-
ers.80 Because these laws are founded on the belief that many
sex offenders are likely to re-offend after release,81 it is neces-
sary to apply the rehabilitative ideal to the treatment of juve-
nile sex offenders, and to question the application of registra-
tion and notification statutes to young sex offenders.
II. APPLYING MEGAN'S LAW ACCORDING TO THE
REHABILITATIVE IDEAL
Although Megan's Law statutes may eventually further the
goals of the juvenile justice system, two problems have plagued
the implementation of the statutes to juvenile offenders. First,
the statutes are restricted by determinate sentencing.8 2 Sec-
ond, they are applied without adequate consideration of the re-
habilitative ideal inherent in the juvenile justice system.83
These application flaws are avoidable, however, if states
consider the public policy goals of the juvenile justice system
tration statute originally suffered from poor compliance by released offenders:
almost one quarter of released offenders did not register with police. See Rob-
ert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating
Tougher Laws or Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM.
& CIV. CONFINEMENT 303, 313 (1997). Because efficacy is much less certain,
the fact that these statutes exist in a significant number of states, see supra
notes 61-68 and accompanying text, and are often applied to juveniles, see su-
pra notes 69-70 and accompanying text, this Note focuses on how notification
laws can be implemented consistent with the legal philosophies of the juvenile
justice system.
79. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd. 4(a)-(b)(1) (1998 & Supp. 1999);
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1(6)(a).
80. See, e.g., supra notes 12, 67 (discussing the community notification
provisions of the Minnesota and New York statutes, respectively).
81. For instance, the state of Washington founded the initial statute in
this body of law on the high recidivism rate of sex offenders. See supra note 61
and accompanying text. Many theorists have characterized registration and
notification statutes as inadequate remedies to sentences that are too short
and penal institutions that do not rehabilitate sexual predators. United
States District Court Judge Nicholas H. Politan has asked, "[W]hy don't the
statesO pass an act stating that if you commit a sex offense against a child you
never get out ofjail-you never get off probation... ?... [If you are convicted
of a crime against a child, that you shall spend life in prison... ?" Robert
Rudolph, Judge Urges Action on Offenders, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Mar.
1, 1995, at 6, available in 1995 WL 5190102.
82. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
83. For a discussion of the rehabilitative ideal, see supra note 26.
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when formulating responses to juvenile sex offenders. 84 The
proposed reforms offered in this Note will reduce the likelihood
that rehabilitated children will be stigmatized, and increase
opportunities for these youths to become safe and productive
members of society. First, juvenile dispositions should be inde-
terminate and nonproportional so that young sex offenders
have ample time to be treated before their release. Second, no-
tification statutes should be applied and enforced by agents of
the juvenile justice system who will use criteria relevant to
young offenders, and consider the potentially damaging effects
of community notification when deciding whether to release ju-
venile offenders. Consequently, Megan's law statutes should be
utilized only in limited circumstances, and always according to
the juvenile justice system's rehabilitative goals.
A. DETERMINATE SENTENCING UNDERMINES REHABILITATION
AND AGGRAVATES THE NEED FOR COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION
Because determinate dispositions are not effective means
of achieving rehabilitation, their imposition complicates the
implementation of Megan's Law statutes. In an ideal world,
every child treated by the juvenile justice system would be
completely rehabilitated.85 There would be no need to notify
communities about rehabilitated sex offenders or track their
whereabouts. Yet, experience has demonstrated that treat-
ment models, while improving, are not completely successful. 86
The fact remains that most juvenile sex offenders will eventu-
ally be released before they have been rehabilitated.87 The cru-
cial question is whether their confinement will end after an ar-
bitrary number of years under determinate sentencing or after
successful completion of treatment. Because public safety is in-
creased by releasing children who are less likely to reperpe-
84. See NPPA GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra note 31, at 69.
85. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
86. Compare supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing improve-
ments in treatment), with supra note 61 (describing the Washington legisla-
ture's frustration with recidivism).
87. Although it is possible for a state to waive all sex offenders into adult
court, see generally supra note 42 and accompanying text, or enact civil com-
mitment statutes that will indefinitely warehouse unrepentant and unreha-
bilitated sex offenders, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 (1998 & Supp. 1999)
(providing for "commitment of persons with sexual psychopathic personalities
and sexually dangerous persons"), the sheer quantity of children who commit
sexual offenses, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text, dictates that
the vast majority of them will eventually be released.
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trate, logic dictates that high-risk offenders should be treated
indeterminately until they can be safely and successfully re-
turned to their communities. 88
Although it appears reasonable to encourage systemic ap-
plication of nonproportiona 89 indeterminate90 sentences to ju-
veniles adjudicated delinquent for committing sex offenses,
such dispositions must still be legal, feasible, and consistent
with public policy. First, in order for indeterminate sentencing
to be applied to juvenile sex offenders, it must be valid under
both the Constitution and individual state statutes. There are
no constitutional objections to this type of sentencing because it
is inherently civil rather than criminal, 91 and rehabilitative
rather than punitive.92 While the Supreme Court has upheld
the application of aspects of criminal procedure in juvenile
court,93 it continues to support the rehabilitative ideal under-
lying the juvenile justice system. 94 Since the purpose of im-
88. In fact, many of the recent attempts to cope with adult sex offenders
could be interpreted as attempts to make their sentences more indeterminate.
Civil commitment statutes make confinement contingent on rehabilitation
rather than the completion of a punitive sentence. See Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 356-71 (1997) (upholding civil commitment statute); In re Lin-
nehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 871-76 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied, Linehan v. Minne-
sota, 120 S. Ct. 587 (1999) (upholding the application of a rehabilitative civil
commitment statute to adult sex offenders); infra note 100 (describing Hen-
dricks in greater detail).
89. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
92. The rehabilitation-retribution distinction also signifies the core values
of the juvenile system. Because juvenile courts are charged with the duty to
fix children rather than to punish them for particular misdeeds, the focal point
of the court's investigation should be the child's needs rather than the charac-
ter of her misdeeds. See supra notes 26, 29-31 and accompanying text.
93. The Court has constitutionalized juvenile court procedures related to
more adversarial facets of the fact-finding process (juveniles' rights to protec-
tion from coerced confessions; procedural due process in certification hearings;
notice, counsel, and confrontation on cross-examination; and protection from
self-incrimination) as well as those relating to commitment, such as the re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the prohibition of double
jeopardy sentences. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94. See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text. In fact, mem-
bers of the Court have cited the difference between nonproportional indeter-
minate sentences and traditional punishment as a reason for upholding the
system. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551-53 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring) ("A typical disposition in the juvenile court ... may authorize con-
finement until age 21, but it will last no longer and within that period will last
only so long as his behavior demonstrates that he remains an unacceptable
risk if returned to his family.")
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posing nonproportional indeterminate dispositions is to maxi-
mize rehabilitation, juveniles' rights under the Due Process,95
Equal Protection,96 and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses 97 are not implicated unless state action begins to re-
semble the punitive adult model.
95. Because due process rights are implicated only by the loss of "life, lib-
erty, or property," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, they are distinguishable from
the juvenile offender's interest, as interpreted by parens patriae, in being re-
habilitated. The tension between the due process and rehabilitation interests
was addressed by the Court in Gault. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). On the
one hand, delinquency dispositions "[do] not deprive the child of any rights,
because he has none. [They] merely provide[ the 'custody' to which the child
is entitled." Id. at 17 (citations omitted). On the other hand, "it would be ex-
traordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity and
the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.' Under our Constitu-
tion, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. at 27-
28. The system created by Gault and its progeny constitutionalizes proceed-
ings most implicated by the due process clause, see supra note 39, but not in-
dividualized dispositions at the core of the rehabilitative model. The system
itself is founded on individual analyses of children's needs even though certain
procedural and sentencing facets mirror adult criminal procedure. See supra
notes 29, 39. The ultimate power to make duration a function of rehabilitation
lies with the parens patriae philosophy in the juvenile courts, at least to the
extent that such discretion is granted by the legislature. See supra notes 34-
35 and accompanying text.
96. Equal protection analyses are founded on the belief that similarly
situated people must receive equal protection from the government. See City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). It does not fol-
low, however, that juveniles and adults are similarly situated. Justice Frank-
furter recognized that "laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate
to abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of spe-
cific difficulties .... The Constitution does not require things which are differ-
ent.., to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940). Because juveniles have different liberty interests
than adults, and because the state has a unique interest in forming rehabilita-
tive dispositions, juvenile offenders are not similarly situated to their adult
counterparts. See supra notes 30-35. The California Supreme Court reached
this conclusion in In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 552-54 (Cal. 1979). It stated:
[T]he state does not have the same purpose in sentencing adults to
prison that it has in committing minors to the Youth Authority.
Adults ... are sentenced to prison as punishment... while minors
adjudged wards of the juvenile courts are committed to the Youth
Authority for the purposes of treatment and rehabilitation.
Id. at 553 (citations omitted).
97. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, see U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII, is inapplicable to indeterminate sentencing for two reasons. First, juve-
nile court dispositions are not punishments; children may be waived into adult
courts for adult consequences, see supra note 42 and accompanying text (de-
scribing waiver), but normal rehabilitative efforts are not punitive. Second,
the Court uses community standards when qualifying whether a punishment
is actually cruel and unusual. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369-80
(1989). In Stanford, the Court held that it is not cruel and unusual to execute
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The application of indeterminate sentences to children who
are incurable may confine some of them to secured facilities for
the duration of the juvenile justice system's jurisdiction,98 but
even this effect does not defeat the state's interests in rehabili-
tation and public safety. Since rehabilitating juvenile sex of-
fenders is a complicated and dynamic process 99 that is analo-
gous to rehabilitative civil commitment of adult sex offenders,
courts should follow precedents established in those cases'0°
and uphold nonproportional indeterminate treatment of juve-
nile sex offenders. 10'
The traditional judicial deference to rehabilitative pro-
grams and limitations on indeterminate sentencing is more
commonly statutory than constitutional. Many states choose to
apply determinate sentencing'0 2 or to place limits on juvenile
seventeen year-olds tried in adult courts, because there is no national consen-
sus on the issue. See id. Therefore, indeterminate sentencing is likely to sur-
vive a challenge under the Eighth Amendment unless a court holds that it is
both a punishment and contrary to national consensus on the issue.
98. If applied in conjunction with civil commitment statutes, see, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. § 253B.185 (1998 & Supp. 1999), such policies could constitute de
facto life sentences for the rare juvenile offender who is inherently and
untreatably dangerous. The question would then become whether continually
unsuccessful rehabilitative attempts would violate the cruel and unusual
punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. See supra note 97. This cri-
tique seems unsuccessful, given the courts' willingness to uphold existing in-
determinate civil commitment statutes. See supra note 88.
99. See supra note 56.
100. See generally Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). The statute
challenged in Hendricks allowed the state to civilly commit sex offenders at
the completion of their criminal sentences. See id. at 350-53. The Court up-
held the state's civil commitment statute because it was neither punitive nor
designed generally to deter crime. See id. at 360-64. Rejecting the argument
that indeterminate confinement is punitive in nature, Justice Thomas wrote
"[flar from any punitive objective, the confinement's duration is instead linked
to the stated purposes of the commitment, namely, to hold the person until his
mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others." Id. at 363.
101. This Note does not advocate the indeterminate civil commitment of all
juvenile sex offenders, but it does acknowledge that, in a small percentage of
cases, children will not respond to treatment. See supra note 57. There are
three reasons to allow such confinement: first, these children will continue to
pose a threat until their rehabilitation is successful, see supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text; second, the likelihood of rehabilitation will only improve
with advances in treatment methods, see supra note 56; and third, by the time
they are outside the scope of the juvenile system their continued treatment
will better serve the goals of the juvenile system if it is continued by the adult
system than if the government releases unrehabilitated offenders into an un-
prepared citizenry. See NPPA GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra
note 31, at 69.
102. See, e.g., supra notes 3 and 6.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court judges' discretion statutorily. 0 3 Thus, if Mary and Na-
than are released before the system deems them rehabilitated,
it will be because the duration of their confinement is limited
by state statute.
In order to justify the use of indeterminate sentencing, re-
habilitation must be effective. If the juvenile justice system
cannot effectively treat the young offender so as to warrant re-
lease, indeterminate sentencing will be punitive rather than
rehabilitative. A further complication is that rehabilitation is
impossible to prove. The uncertainty of successful treatment
may result in the permanent commitment of every offender.' °4
However, an appropriate rehabilitative standard may be found
by utilizing the treatment goals of the juvenile justice system10 5
and predicating release on both objective manifestations of re-
habilitation and the likelihood of recidivism. Evidence of the
former may be inferred from individual treatment results,
while the latter can be extrapolated from recidivism rates
within the aggregate juvenile sex offender population. If
treatment programs for juvenile offenders continue to im-
prove, 0 6 the ability to treat offenders and predict recidivism
will lead to shorter sentences. If the efficacy of treatment
strategies levels off, relatively long dispositions will continue to
characterize indeterminate sentencing. 0 7 In either case, fo-
cusing on individuals rather than offenses throughout the
treatment process, and monitoring the success rates of ostensi-
bly rehabilitated offenders, will allow states to analyze their
progress and adjust law-enforcement tactics'08 and treatment
strategies accordingly.
103. See supra note 34.
104. Cf supra note 98 and accompanying text.
105. These goals are the protection of the community and the rehabilitation
of the juvenile offender. See NPPA GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, su-
pra note 31, at 69.
106. See supra note 56.
107. This refers to the states' interest in balancing rehabilitation and pub-
lic safety. See NPPA GUIDES FOR JUVENILE COURT JUDGES, supra note 31, at
69. If rehabilitation is impossible, the balance shifts in favor of public safety;
at that point, incapacitation may be the only viable consequence for juvenile
offenders.
108. If trends appear in the recidivism of registered sex offenders, police
will be able to adjust law enforcement and public education strategies accord-
ingly. For instance, if meta-analyses of treatment strategies reveal that juve-
niles with certain habits of offenses are more likely to re-offend, law enforce-
ment may be able to improve their protection of at-risk groups, or more
quickly compile lists of suspects from registered sex offenders.
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Finally, in order for indeterminate sentencing to be applied
under notification statutes, it must also be a good policy deci-
sion. It is illogical to implement a dispositional model if it is
legal and feasible but completely antithetical to the public
safety and rehabilitative goals. Indeterminate sentencing will
maximize the state's interest in protecting public safety be-
cause it will prevent obviously dangerous offenders from being
released merely because their term has run.10 9 Conversely, it
will maximize the state's interest in rehabilitating youthful of-
fenders because it will predicate their release on the effective-
ness of their treatment rather than on an arbitrary limit that
may come long before-or after-these children are actually
ready to rejoin society. Some legislators may be reluctant to
confer such discretion upon juvenile courts, lest they be per-
ceived as insufficiently tough on crime, but these political hur-
dles to good public policy should be recognized and overcome.
Because indeterminate sentencing can be enacted legally,
may be implemented feasibly, and ultimately serves the state's
interest in public safety and the rehabilitation of youthful of-
fenders, it is a fundamental step toward the proper application
of Megan's Law statutes to juvenile sex offenders. If Nathan
and Mary are released from treatment before they are rehabili-
tated, they pose a risk to their communities and may never be-
come fully functional members of society. Such a risk may
warrant community notification. If they are released only after
successful treatment, however, neither their interests nor soci-
ety's are furthered by notifying the community of their prior
sex offenses. By ensuring rehabilitation through indeterminate
sentences, and by implementing notification statutes in accor-
dance with the rehabilitative ideal, states will decrease the
need for Megan's Law while maintaining the primary goals of
the juvenile justice system.
B. COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
As currently implemented, the nexus between Megan's
Law statutes and juvenile justice systems ranges from nonex-
istent to inadequately founded on the system's policy goals. On
the one hand, most states do not use registration and notifica-
tion statutes to address the risks juvenile sex offenders pose to
109. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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public safety. 110 On the other hand, the states that apply Me-
gan's Law statutes to juveniles do not do so according to the re-
habilitative ideal. First, the statutes are not part of the juve-
nile systems, and they are not implemented by agents of those
systems.'1 ' Second, the statutes are generally not implemented
using evaluative criteria that is appropriate for children.
Third, these statutes do not weigh the stigmatizing effects of
community notification against the jurisdiction's rehabilitative
efforts on behalf of young offenders. Finally, community notifi-
cation in adult systems is not narrowly tailored to the treat-
ment needs of the released juvenile offender.
The Minnesota and New York statutes are good examples
of how states fail to reconcile Megan's Law with the rehabilita-
tive ideal. The Minnesota statute allows an "end-of-
confinement review committee"" 2 to determine the appropriate
level of notification" 3 for young sex offenders deemed rehabili-
tated by the juvenile system. The New York legislature, how-
ever, explicitly excludes juveniles from the scope of its registra-
tion and notification statutes, allowing unrehabilitated youth to
finish determinate sentences and silently reenter their commu-
nities.14 Megan's Law statutes may be intended to serve as
some sort of check on juvenile court dispositions, but since they
cannot fix unreasonably long sentences, the only balance they
can provide is by requiring registration and notification. This
ostensive balance does not serve rehabilitative purposes, par-
ticularly because the model does not use evaluative criteria
relevant to young offenders.
The first flaw in the application of adult community notifi-
cation statutes to juvenile offenders is that the state actors who
release a child are not involved in the treatment efforts of the
young offender, and they have no control over who will be in-
formed about the child's presence and history upon release." 5
Whereas agents of the juvenile justice system can decide that a
child has been sufficiently rehabilitated to rejoin their commu-
110. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text (describing the risks juvenile
sex offenders pose to public safety).
111. See, e.g., supra notes 9-12, 67.
112. See supra note 10.
113. See supra notes 10, 12 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
115. Because the notification statute is applied by agents of the adult sys-
tem, the juvenile justice system that treated the youth offender will not be
able to influence the scope of notification. See supra notes 12, 67.
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nity, 16 an agent of the adult community notification board can
undermine that decision by determining that the child's pro-
pensity to re-offend is so dangerous that her entire neighbor-
hood and school must be notified of her sex offenses. 117 Al-
though the juvenile board is astute in assessing juvenile
conduct, the adult board's expertise relates to the risk posed by
adult offenders."18 The administrators of general notification
statutes are accustomed to assessing adults because the ma-
jority of the sex offender population is comprised of adults, 119
but precursors to adult recidivism may not be useful or appro-
priate when predicting recidivism among juvenile offenders. 120
States can therefore best serve the rehabilitative ideal and the
safety of the public by having juvenile justice experts make in-
dividualized assessments of the need for community notifica-
tion.
The second consideration in the application of Megan's
Law to juveniles is that the criteria used for determining the
type of community notification should be specifically tailored to
the characteristics of youthful offenders. Although some of the
factors in estimating recidivism appear applicable to juve-
niles, 12' others are irrelevant to young offenders 122 or require
116. See supra notes 10, 67.
117. See supra notes 12, 67.
118. See supra note 10.
119. Even if that population is proportionately smaller than the adult
population as a whole, the vast majority of sex offenders are still adults. Cf
supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
121. For instance, the Minnesota statute examines the seriousness of the
offense if the offender should re-offend, the offender's prior offense history, the
offender's characteristics, and whether there is credible evidence in the record
that indicates that the offender will re-offend if released into the community.
See MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd. 3(g) (1998 & Supp. 1999). These ar6 broad
categories, but they may be a useful starting point in analyzing youthful of-
fenders.
122. The Minnesota statute, for example, asks "whether the offender dem-
onstrates a physical condition that minimizes the risk of reoffense, including
but not limited to, advanced age ... ." Id. § 244.052 subd. (3)(g)(6). Moreover,
the mere fact that the statute considers "the availability of community sup-
ports to the offender," id. § 244.052 subd. 4, "the... likelihood that the of-
fender will be involved in therapeutic treatment[,]" id. § 244.052 subd.
3(g)(4)(i), and "the availability of... a stable and supervised living arrange-
ment in an appropriate location[,]" id. § 244.052 subd. 3(g)(4)(ii), ignores the
statutory requirement of treatment and supervised living for juvenile sex of-
fenders. See supra note 3. Because at-risk juveniles must always be the sub-
ject of rehabilitative efforts and therapeutic treatment, and a stable living en-
vironment is a consideration of any juvenile court disposition, these factors are
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different benchmarks for analysis. 123 For instance, the assess-
ment process could consider whether the juvenile offended at
school or at home; whether the child appreciated the signifi-
cance of her conduct at the time of the offense; how the child
has developed emotionally and intellectually contemporane-
ously with her treatment; or the extent to which the juvenile's
family will monitor her reintegration and support her after-
care.124 Ultimately, in a rehabilitative model, the individual-
ized needs of the children will supersede general characteristics
of adult offenders. If members of Mary's community are to be
notified about her prior offense, it should be because she pres-
ents a genuine risk to public safety, not because the board has
failed to take into account the stages of childhood psychological
development.
irrelevant to the disposition of juvenile offenders. Finally, if "the offender's
lack of education or employment stability[,]" MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd.
3(g)(4)(iv), affects their evaluation under this statute, they may actually have
an Equal Protection claim against the statute's application.
123. For instance, when construing the offender's prior offense history, the
Minnesota board is to consider both the duration of the offender's prior offense
history and the length of time since the offender's last prior offense. See
MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd. 3(g)(2)(iii)-(iv). Time is much more relative with
a young child than an adult; what may appear short in absolute time can be
significant as a proportion of life or in stages of emotional development. When
the board "construes the offender's prior history of other antisocial acts[,]" id.
§ 244.052 subd. 3(g)(2)(v), it should be able to distinguish between what con-
stitutes antisocial behavior for adults, and what constitutes antisocial behav-
ior for children.
124. It is outside the scope of this Note to formulate an exhaustive list of
specific factors, but it seems evident that they could be determined through a
process similar to one which created factors for evaluating adult offenders, or
by adopting tools from child psychology and psychiatry. The authors of Prac-
tice Parameters suggest a system in which a clinical psychiatrist conducts an
interview with the offender to qualify her likelihood of recidivism and need for
treatment. See Practice Parameters, supra note 56, at 65S. The clinician
would evaluate the juvenile offender's sexual history; developmental and psy-
chosocial history; legal history, including non-sexual violent crimes against
animals; medical and psychiatric history, including sexually transmitted dis-
eases and psychopathology; school and academic history; and a mental status
examination that assesses the presence of personality and organic disorders,
substance abuse, and risk of self-harm. See id. The mental status examina-
tion may be particularly appropriate in circumstances where a juvenile may be
released to some level of community notification, because it assesses
"[aipprehension by judicial authority and the associated shame of exposure,
embarrassment, stigmatization, fear of punishment, and incarceration [which]
are risk factors for suicidal behavior." Id. at 65S-66S. Because the interview
is conducted by psychiatrists rather than administrators, they are better able
to assess the different stages of psychological development, and the different
risks posed by preadolescents and adolescents. See supra note 56 and accom-
panying text.
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The third consideration is the need to weigh the impact of
the notification process itself against the juvenile offender's re-
habilitation. Confidentiality'25 and reducing the threat of un-
necessary stigmatization 126 should be paramount in every juve-
nile court decision. Indeterminate sentencing and sensitivity to
the effects of notification statutes would make it possible for
evaluators to decide whether a child's interests are better
served by indeterminate confinement or by release to an inhos-
pitable community. For instance, both the Minnesota and New
York statutes provide for widespread public dissemination of
information about certain types of sex offenders. 27 This is in-
appropriate for juvenile offenders. Because the juvenile justice
system is founded on the rehabilitative ideal and should be im-
plemented with indeterminate sentencing, no child should be
released if she represents such a public risk that widespread
community notification is necessary. 28 Even with the uncer-
tainties inherent in rehabilitating sex offenders, a juvenile who
is assessed to be the highest risk to her community should not
be released if indeterminate dispositions could otherwise im-
prove treatment and protect public safety. The implementation
of a notification statute would undermine the juvenile justice
system's emphasis on confidentiality and avoidance of stigma
that characterize the rehabilitative ideal. If community notifi-
cation is constructed to serve the goals of the juvenile justice
system, incapacitation should outweigh current policy that ar-
bitrarily favors either rehabilitation or public safety to the det-
riment of the other.
The final consideration is that the scope of community noti-
fication should be tailored to juvenile offenders. If notification
is a function of rehabilitation, it should be limited to the state
actors who will protect the interests of the juvenile: law en-
forcement agents, teachers, psychologists, and legal guardi-
ans. 129 Parties notified of the presence and predilections of par-
125. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 12, 67 and accompanying text.
128. Thus, in Minnesota, a determination that a child would be released as
a Level III offender, and subject to the highest level of community notification,
see MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subd.4(b)(3) (1998 & Supp. 1999), should preclude
release. If indeterminate sentencing and juvenile-sensitive experts were util-
ized, however, such events should be uncommon.
129. This is roughly the equivalent of Level II notification under the Min-
nesota statute. See id. § 244.052 subd. 4(b)(2). However, Minnesota's Level H
notification is extended to schools, day cares, and other "organizations that
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ticular juvenile offenders must respect the confidentiality of
such information. 130 Although any type of notification may in-
cidentally lead to collateral breaches in data privacy, individu-
alized notification-and sanctions for breach of confidential-
ity131-can protect the balance of public safety and
rehabilitation.
States will be able to maximize their interests in rehabili-
tating children and protecting potential victims by combining
registration and notification statutes with indeterminate sen-
tencing. Additionally, states should require an evaluation pro-
cess conducted by juvenile justice experts using criteria and
strategies that are appropriate for juvenile offenders. Children
will not be released unless their rehabilitation appears likely,
and only a select group of specialists will be notified of their
prior sex offenses, resulting in a greater likelihood of their re-
habilitation. Because fewer unrehabilitated children will be
released, communities will be safer.
CONCLUSION
The application of Megan's Law statutes to juvenile sex of-
fenders demands attention because it represents a nexus of the
state's interests in public safety and the rehabilitation of juve-
nile offenders. The states have invested a century of time and
resources in developing a system capable of curing children's
social ills. States have also attempted to protect their commu-
nities from the unique threats that young offenders pose.
Through proper implementation, registration statutes can
strengthen the rehabilitative efforts of the juvenile justice sys-
tem. Community notification statutes may provide information
primarily serve individuals likely to be victimized by the offender." See id.
The difficulty in implementing a notification statute like this is in finding a
balance between notifying enough people to protect public safety and doing it
in such a way as to avoid unnecessary disclosures and stigmatization. Disclo-
sure is warranted because of the risk juvenile offenders pose, particularly to
other children. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. By extending
disclosure to non-supervisory state actors, Minnesota increases the risk of
overly broad disclosure. If correctly implemented and rigorously enforced,
Minnesota's Level II notification may be a viable alternative for states that
want to place a greater emphasis on public safety.
130. Although the Minnesota statute protects the confidentiality of this in-
formation, see MINN. STAT. § 243.166 subd. 7 (1998), New York laws would
have to be modified if applied to minors. See supra note 67.
131. See supra note 19.
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to state agents without undermining the rehabilitation of re-
leased offenders.
Registration and notification statutes have the potential to
become punitive weapons that undermine the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile system. If applied correctly, however, such
statutes may serve the states' interests by protecting public
safety and rehabilitating young offenders. To do so effectively,
states must implement nonproportional indeterminate disposi-
tions that provide individualized treatment models with dura-
tions relevant to the juvenile offender's treatment needs. Sec-
ond, registration and notification statutes should be
implemented by agents of the juvenile justice system who will
consider the effects of community notification on the offender's
rehabilitative needs. When applied, notification should be lim-
ited to the extent necessary to nurture juveniles' rehabilitation
and to protect public safety. It will be a challenge for legisla-
tures and courts to look past punitive sound bites and propose
progressive solutions. The ultimate result of this experiment
will transcend the false dichotomy and benefit our children and
our communities.
20001 1835
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:18051836
